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TOWARD A UNIFORM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL 
PROTECTION ORDER LAW 
Ashley Hahn* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Department of Justice broadly defines domestic 
violence (DV) as a “pattern of abusive behavior”—including “physical, 
sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of 
actions”—used “by one [person] to gain or maintain power and control over 
another [person].”1  Legal scholars, academics, advocates, and psychologists 
also largely embrace this broad definition of DV.2  Unfortunately, however, 
domestic violence civil protection order (DVCPO) laws across the United 
States do not uniformly employ an expansive definition of DV.3  Instead, 
many state DVCPO statutes narrowly define DV and consequently leave 
many survivors without needed protection.4  Thus, a uniform, comprehensive 
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 1  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Domestic Violence, (June 16, 2017) https://www.justice.go
v/ovw/domestic-violence.  
 2  See Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming 
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1119–20 (2009).  See, e.g., Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century: Looking Back 
and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 356 (2008) (“The core concept is the exercise of 
power and control, for domestic violence involves a wide range of behaviors including 
physical abuse, verbal abuse, threats, stalking, sexual abuse, coercion, and economic 
control.”); Edward S. Snyder & Laura W. Morgan, Domestic Violence Ten Years Later, 19 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 33, 33 n.2 (2004) (“‘Domestic violence’ occurs when one intimate 
partner uses physical violence, threats, stalking, harassment, or emotional or financial abuse 
to control, manipulate, coerce, or intimidate the other partner.”); see also Tamara L. Kuennen, 
“No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the 
Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 39 (2007); ELIZABETH M. 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 44 (2d ed. 2008).  
 3  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1129; see also Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: 
Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality of Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
35, 36 (2008).  
 4  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1138 (“With a limited view of domestic violence, anyone 
who has been subjected to various forms of domestic violence not covered under the CPO 
statutory definition of domestic violence cannot file a cause of action or obtain a remedy.”).  
For a discussion examining how states narrowly define DV, see infra Part III.  A CDVPO is 
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DVCPO law enacted throughout the United States is needed to allow all DV 
survivors access to legal relief. 
This Comment examines the need for state enactment of a uniform 
DVCPO law across the United States.  Part II details the phenomenon of DV 
and the historical development of DV civil law.  Part III discusses the current 
state of DVCPO law.  This Part highlights the different statutory definitions 
of DV and the relief available in state statutes through a fifty-state survey 
analysis.  Part IV examines the need for a uniform, expansive DVCPO law 
across the United States.  Next, Part V asserts that Congress should 
encourage individual states to adopt a uniform DVCPO law through its 
constitutional Article I spending power.  Part VI concludes that use of the 
spending power should be successful in light of the anticipated benefits of a 
national uniform DVCPO law, Congress’s past success of using the spending 
power in the context of other national DV laws, and the need for increased 
funding and resources to address DV.  Part VII briefly concludes. 
II. DV AND DV LAW 
A. The Phenomenon of DV 
DV is a highly prevalent, pervasive, and significant problem in the 
United States.  On average, three women are murdered every day by their 
husbands or boyfriends5 and about half of all women will experience 
psychological aggression by an intimate partner in their lifetimes.6  Although 
the majority of reported DV survivors are women, DV can be experienced 
by anyone—regardless of gender, race, age, sexual orientation, educational 
level, socioeconomic status, or religion.7 
DV significantly affects every part of a survivor’s life8 on an individual, 
family, and community level.9  DV is the leading cause of injury and death 
for women in the United States10 and may result in a range of both acute and 
 
a civil restraining order that provides different forms of protection for survivors of DV, 
including enjoining the alleged abuser from abusing or contacting the survivor.  See generally 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 2.  
 5  Domestic Violence Statistics, http://domesticviolencestatistics.org/domestic-violence-
statistics/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).  Additionally, every nine seconds a woman is assaulted 
or beaten in the United States.  Id.  
 6   MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 2 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisv
s_report2010-a.pdf. 
 7  U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 1; Baker, supra note 3, at 35 (“Domestic abuse afflicts 
families across eras, cultures, and economic strata.”); Jason Palmer, Domestic Violence, 11 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 97, 101 (2010). 
 8  Schneider, supra note 2, at 357.  
 9  U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 1.   
 10  BLACK ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.   
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chronic mental health outcomes for survivors.11  Families are also affected 
because DV can threaten family safety and stability and teach children that 
violence is acceptable.12  Additionally, DV negatively impacts community 
safety and welfare,13 contributes to other societal problems,14 is a significant 
public health concern,15 and can cost survivors and society more than $5.8 
billion every year.16 
DVCPOs help to address the effects of DV by providing benefits to 
both survivors and to society.17  As an effective legal remedy,18 protection 
orders provide financial, physical, psychological, and safety benefits for 
survivors19 by promoting autonomy, safety, decision-making, and 
 
 11  Id.  DV survivors may also be prevented from obtaining education, employment, and 
economic independence.  See Sally F. Goldfarb, Expert Paper from Meeting of the Experts 
on Violence Against Women, U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women 4 (May 20, 2005), 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/docs/experts/goldfarb.legaldomain.
pdf (citing Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: 
Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y, & L. 251 (2003)) 
[hereinafter Goldfarb1].   
 12  DALE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE: A MODEL STATE CODE (1994), http://www.n
cjfcj.org/sites/default/files/modecode_fin_printable.pdf. 
 13  Id.  
 14  See Susan L. Keilitz, Civil Protection Orders: A Viable Justice System Tool for 
Deterring Domestic Violence, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 79, 82 (1994) (“[P]rotection orders are 
a potentially powerful, if not perfect, justice system response to domestic violence.”); Jane K. 
Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1080–81 (2014). 
 15  MATTHEW J. BREIDING ET AL., PREVALENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION—NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY, UNITED STATES 1 (2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf. 
 16  ILEANA ARIAS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipvbo
ok-a.pdf.  
 17  See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic 
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1487 (2008) [hereinafter Goldfarb2].  By reducing DV, DVCPOs also reduce the 
significant financial impact that DV can have on society.  See generally T.K. LOGAN ET AL., 
THE KENTUCKY CIVIL PROTECTIVE ORDER STUDY: A RURAL AND URBAN MULTIPLE 
PERSPECTIVE STUDY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER VIOLATION CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, AND 
COSTS 144, 144, 154 (2009) (noting savings of $30.75 in avoided costs to society and $85 
million in savings to the state due to declines in domestic abuse). 
 18  Several studies suggest that DVCPOs are generally effective.  See Carol E. Jordan, 
Intimate Partner Violence and the Justice System: An Examination of the Interface, 19 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1412, 1424–25 (2004) (reviewing studies of the effectiveness of 
DVCPOs and concluding that there are mixed results for effectiveness).  See generally 
Carolyn N. Ko, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Question of 
“Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361 (2002); Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and 
Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 123–
24 (2005).   
 19  See Stoever, supra note 14, at 1083.  Studies show that survivors report improved 
HAHN_FORMATTED.DOCXHAHN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  3:28 PM 
900 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:897 
empowerment.20  DVCPOs also provide advantages over the available 
criminal relief for DV21 and can help connect survivors with different 
resources.22  Even though DVCPOs are the most frequently used legal tools 
for DV survivors, only a small percentage of survivors actually file for or 
receive an order.23  Therefore, DVCPO laws have the potential to make an 
even greater impact. 
B. Development of Civil DV Order Law 
The United States’ legal system “has traditionally been unresponsive to 
the needs” of DV survivors, as governments were hesitant to intervene 
because of concerns about paternalistic intervention into, and preservation 
of, the private family unit.24  Only recently—within the past fifty years—did 
the Battered Women’s Movement begin to change the DV legal and social 
discourse to recognize DV as a public concern by linking DV to larger 
societal and cultural institutions.25  Advocates fought for the creation of 
 
mental health outcomes after receiving a DVCPO, including feeling better about themselves, 
their safety, and the future.  See generally Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When ‘Enough is 
Enough’: Battered Women’s Decision Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 414, 414, 424 (1995); see also SUSAN L. KEILITZ ET. AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997) [hereinafter Keilitz2] (noting that over eighty-five percent of 
survivors who obtained an order felt their lives had improved since getting the order, and over 
eighty percent felt safer); Caroline V. Wright & Dawn M. Johnson, Encouraging Legal Help 
Seeking for Victims of Intimate Partner Violence: The Therapeutic Effects of the Civil 
Protection Order, 25 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 675 (2012) [hereinafter Wright].   
 20  See Edward W. Gondolf et. al., Court Response to Petitions for Civil Protection 
Orders, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 503, 504 (1994); Stoever, supra note 14, at 1021.  
 21  See Smith, supra note 18, at 119–26 (noting that compared to criminal relief, DVCPOs 
have (i) more comprehensive, survivor-centered and survivor-influenced remedies and 
protection; (ii) tangible emotional benefits by empowering survivors and sending a message 
that DV will not be tolerated; (iii) and procedural benefits such as lower burdens of proof and 
increased or additional criminal penalties for violation of a DVCPO). 
 22  See Alesha Durfee, Victim Narratives, Legal Representation, and Domestic Violence 
Civil Protection Orders, 4 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 7, 8 (2009); Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 
1509.  
 23  See Baker, supra note 3, at 38 (“Civil protection orders are perhaps the most popular 
and commonly used legal tool to emerge from this era.”); Smith, supra note 18, at 95 
(“Domestic violence civil protection orders are effective yet underused weapons against 
domestic violence.”).   
 24  See Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 1494; Kuennen, supra note 2, at 32; Stoever, supra 
note 14, at 1040. 
 25  Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 139, 143 (2010) (noting that the recognition of DV as a larger social problem is a 
“relatively recent phenomenon”); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle 
for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657 (2004) reprinted in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 27 (2d ed. 2008) (noting a change from 
DV being ignored or condoned to DV being addressed as a “matter of public concern”).  For 
more information about the historical development of DV law, see Deborah Epstein, Effective 
Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and 
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DVCPO laws because of their potential to (1) end the public/private 
dichotomy that categorized DV as a private issue; (2) shape public discourse 
to recognize DV as a societal harm that affects everyone and can happen to 
anyone; and (3) directly address DV by promoting survivor safety, 
autonomy, and protection.26  By the mid-1990s, all fifty states enacted 
DVCPO laws with varying forms of qualifying relationships, qualifying acts 
of abuse, and available relief.27 
III. DVCPO LAW: A FIFTY-STATE ANALYSIS 
This Part summarizes the results of an independent, fifty-state survey 
analysis of DVCPO law.28  DVCPOs are generally obtained through a legal 
process involving two or three phases: (1) emergency ex-parte orders that 
may be issued if the survivor needs immediate protection during hours when 
the court is not in session; (2) temporary ex-parte orders of protection issued 
without a hearing or notice to the alleged abuser; and (3) final protection 
orders issued after a hearing, prior to which the alleged abuser received 
notice and service of the complaint.29  Every state permits temporary ex-
parte protection orders and final protection orders;30 however, only twenty-
 
the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 9–13 (1999); Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All 
You Have is a Hammer: Society’s Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 
CATH. U.L. REV. 919, 925–37 (2011); Summer H. Carlisle & Shana Tabak, Ninth Annual 
Review of Gender and Sexuality Law Chapter: Federal Domestic Violence Law, 9 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 661, 664–94 (2008).   
 26  See Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 25, at 169.  There are other forms of protection 
orders separate from the DV legal context that provide relief for similar conduct, including 
stalking, harassment, and sexual assault.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-16a (West 2018) 
(“Issuance of civil protection order on behalf of person who has been [a survivor] of sexual 
abuse, assault or stalking.”).   
 27  See Jane C. Murphy, Symposium, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on 
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 
502 (2003). 
 28  This survey was completed with DVCPO state statutes as of February 1, 2018.  The 
survey includes only an analysis of the statutory text and does not include an analysis of 
relevant case law.   
 29  See Baker, supra note 3, at 40–42; SCHNEIDER ET. AL., supra note 2, at 255–56.   
 30  See generally ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (LexisNexis 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110 
(2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-15-206–07 (2017); CAL. 
FAM. CODE §§ 6320–47 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-14-104.5, 105 (2017); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1043, 1045 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 
(2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4, 5.5 (2017); IDAHO CODE 
§ 39-6308 (2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9 (2017); IOWA 
CODE § 236.4 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3106 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.730, 
740 (LexisNexis 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2135–36 (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4006 
(2017); MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. LAW §§ 4-505–06 (LexisNexis 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
209A, §§ 3–4 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950 (LexisNexis 2017); MINN. STAT. 
§ 518B.01 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-11, 15 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010.1 
(2017); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-201–02 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-924–25 (2017); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:4–5 (2017); N.J. 
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three state statutes specifically include provisions that permit emergency 
DVCPOs.31 
Generally, a DV survivor must meet two requirements to receive a 
DVCPO: the survivor must show (1) “that [he/she] shares a particular type 
of relationship with her abuser,” and (2) “that [he/she] suffered a particular 
form of abuse at his hands.”32  These are respectively referred to as “act” and 
“relationship” requirements.33 
A. The Relationship Requirement 
To qualify for a DVCPO, the survivor and abuser generally must have 
at least one of the following relationships: family member, household 
member, dating relationship, or intimate partner.34  States vary in which 
types of relationships qualify.  For example, six states do not explicitly 
include family members related by blood35 and nine states do not include 
family members related by marriage36 as qualifying relationships.  
Furthermore, only three states do not include current or former spouses,37 
eight states do not include household members,38 six states do not include 
 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-28–29 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-13-4–5 (2017); N.Y. FAM. LAW 
§ 828 (Consol. 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 
(2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (LexisNexis 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.2–3 
(2017); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.710, 718 (2017); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107 (2017); 15 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-19 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-
10-6 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE § 83.001 (West 2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-7-403–04 (LexisNexis 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104 (2017); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.070 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 
48-27-203 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-21-104–05 (2017).   
 31  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3624; CAL. FAM. CODE § 6250; 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-103; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1043; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217; 
IOWA CODE § 236.6; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3105; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.645; LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 46:2135; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4003; MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. LAW § 4-504.1; MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 5; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3.2; N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 50B-2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-08; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.3; 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 6110; 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-4; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104; VA. CODE ANN. § 
16.1-253.4; W. VA. CODE § 48-27-203.  
 32  Smith, supra note 18, at 102. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Palmer, supra note 7, at 146–48.   
 35  See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402; WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-101.   
 36  See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; 
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19; S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-4-20; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402; WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-101.   
 37  See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402; VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2017). 
 38  See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 
(LexisNexis 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 
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any form of dating or sexual relationships besides marriage,39 and six states 
do not include having a child together40 as statutory qualifying relationships.  
Even though most state DVCPO statutes enumerate dating relationships as 
qualifying relationships, the statutory definition and/or case law 
interpretation of the term “dating relationship” may nonetheless exclude 
survivors from obtaining relief.  For example, Alabama’s DVCPO statute 
defines a “dating relationship” as: 
 
A significant relationship of a romantic or intimate nature 
characterized by the expectation of affectionate or sexual 
involvement over a period of time and on a continuing basis 
during the course of the relationship . . . . A dating relationship 
does not include a casual or business relationship or a relationship 
that ended more than 12 months prior to the filing of the petition 
for a protection order.41 
 
Additionally, South Carolina’s and North Carolina’s opposite-sex 
qualifications may deny relief to homosexual couples in dating or romantic 
relationships.42  Conversely, Maine’s and Washington’s DVCPO statutes 
seem to directly include same-sex dating relationships by enumerating 
“domestic partners” as qualifying relationships.43  Washington, however, 
does not include some teen dating relationships as qualifying relationships 
because its statute excludes relationships involving children under the age of 
sixteen.44 
 
 
 
(2017); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2017); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-1 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §25-10-3.1 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402.  
 39  See generally FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2016); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 403.720; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3 (LexisNexis 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-4-20; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017). 
 40  IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3 (2017); 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 6102; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402; VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101.   
 41  ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(3)(a), (c) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 42  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘personal 
relationship’ means a relationship wherein the parties involved . . . (2) Are persons of opposite 
sex who live together or have lived together; . . . (6) Are persons of the opposite sex who are 
in a dating relationship or have been in a dating relationship.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20.  
 43  ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4002 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (2017). 
 44  WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (noting that the following qualify for statutory relief: 
“persons sixteen years of age or older who are presently residing together or who have resided 
together in the past and who have or have had a dating relationship, persons sixteen years of 
age or older with whom a person sixteen years of age or older has or has had a dating 
relationship”).   
HAHN_FORMATTED.DOCXHAHN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  3:28 PM 
904 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:897 
Finally, some states broadly define the relationship requirement.  For 
example, North Dakota invites judicial discretion to determine which 
relationships qualify for relief by permitting the court to grant relief to “any 
other person if the court determines that the relationship between that person 
and the alleged abuser is sufficient to warrant the issuance of a domestic 
violence protection order.”45 
B. The Act Requirement 
States define the act requirement in three different ways: (1) by 
enumerating specific criminal offenses as qualifying acts; (2) by listing 
conduct not directly related to a criminal offense, such as “physical harm” 
and “fear of imminent serious, bodily injury” as qualifying acts; or (3) a 
mixed approach that includes both specific criminal code provisions and 
conduct not directly related to a criminal offense.46  In the United States, 
eleven states define the act requirement as exclusively criminal offenses,47 
nineteen states include only conduct not directly related to criminal 
offenses,48 and twenty-one states have the mixed approach that includes both 
criminal offenses and conduct not directly related to criminal offenses.49 
 
 
 
 45  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (2017).  
 46  Some states have an additional timing requirement where the act of abuse must have 
occurred within a specific recent time frame before the survivor filed for a DVCPO.  See, e.g., 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.710 (2015) (requiring that the survivor experience abuse within the past 
180 days).   
 47  ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (LexisNexis 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2017); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 13-3601 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2016); 
IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 
(2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (2017); N.Y. 
FAM. LAW § 812 (Consol. 2017). 
 48  ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38a (2016); IDAHO 
CODE § 39-6303 (2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-6-2-34.5 
(2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (LexisNexis 
2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950 
(LexisNexis 2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2017); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705; 
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-1 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
36-3-601 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-204 (2017; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2017).   
 49  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2017); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (2017); MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. 
LAW § 4-501 (LexisNexis 2017); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4002 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 
(2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2017); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3113.31 (LexisNexis 2017); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-
10-1 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 71.003–021 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402 
(LexisNexis 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010; WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017). 
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Despite the varying definitions of the act requirement, more than half 
of the states narrowly define DV solely as physical acts centered on physical 
harm or injury.50  A few states define DV more broadly and include forms of 
non-physical abuse;51 for example, seventeen states include harassment.52  
Twenty-eight states include stalking53 as a qualifying act of DV.  Only five 
states’ act requirements, however, include causing emotional or 
psychological harm as qualifying acts of abuse.54 
 
 
 50  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (“Family abuse means any act involving violence, 
force, or threat that results in bodily injury or places one in reasonable apprehension of death, 
sexual assault, or bodily injury and that is committed by a person against such person’s family 
or household member.”); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38a; 
FLA. STAT. § 741.28; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1; IDAHO CODE § 39-6303; IND. CODE § 34-6-
2-34.5; IOWA CODE § 236.2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720; 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132; MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. LAW § 4-501; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, 
§ 1; MINN. STAT. § 518B.01; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102; 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31; 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102; 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-1; S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-4-20; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-10-1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601; TEX. 
FAM. CODE § 71.004; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101; WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.50.010; WIS. STAT. § 813.12; W. VA. CODE § 48-27-204; WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 35-21-102.  Please note that several statutes include acts only relating to physical violence 
or bodily injury and stalking.  
 51  See generally Palmer, supra note 7, at 145–47.  
 52  ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (LexisNexis 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2017); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 13-3601 (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101; HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 586-4; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4002; MO. REV. 
STAT. § 455.010.1; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3 
(2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 
812 (Consol. 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1; W. VA. CODE § 
48-27-204.  
 53  ALA. CODE § 30-5-2; ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601; CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 6203; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-138a; FLA. STAT. 
§ 741.28; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1; IND. CODE § 34-6-2-34.5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
403.720; MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. LAW § 4-501; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4002; MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 93-21-3; MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010.1; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:25-19; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 812; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3113.31; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-10-3.1; 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
15-5-1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
228; WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010; W. VA. CODE § 48-27-204; WIS. STAT. § 813.12.  
 54  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041; HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. 
§ 600.2950 (LexisNexis 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017).  
Hawaii’s act requirement includes “extreme psychological abuse” as a qualifying act of DV 
and defines “extreme psychological abuse” as “intentional or knowing course of conduct 
directed at an individual that seriously alarms or disturbs, consistently or continually bothers 
the individual, and that serve no legitimate purpose; provided that such course of conduct 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer extreme emotional distress.”  HAW. REV. STAT. § 
586-4. 
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C. Relief Options 
DVCPO statutes provide varying forms of relief that fall into four main 
categories: (1) injunctive relief; (2) monetary relief; (3) family and support 
related relief; and (4) additional relief.55 
1. Injunctive Relief 
Injunctive relief may include prohibiting the abuser from threatening, 
abusing, contacting, harassing or being near the survivor; evicting and 
excluding the abuser from the survivor’s residence; and prohibiting the 
abuser from engaging in other actions such as possessing a firearm or 
harming a pet.56  Every state prohibits “domestic violence.”57 
Many states offer the opportunity to receive injunctive relief for 
conduct that on its own would not qualify as an act of DV under the statutory 
act requirement.  For example, even though only seventeen states directly 
include harassment as a qualifying act of DV,58 twenty-four states allow 
relief from harassment.59  Similarly, five states include an injunction against 
 
 55  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1111 (identifying three relief categories: injunctive, 
monetary, and family).   
 56  Id. (explaining forms of injunctive relief). 
 57  Forty-three state statutes provide specific relief against DV or domestic abuse.  See 
ALA. CODE § 30-5-7; ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602; ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 9-15-205 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045; FLA. STAT. § 741.30; GA. CODE 
ANN. § 19-13-4; HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4; IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (2017); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 60/214; IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9; IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3107 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740; LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2017); ME. STAT. 
tit. 19-A, § 4007; MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. LAW § 4-506; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2017); 
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15; MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:25-29; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 842; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3; 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4; OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 
(2015); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 (2017); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 
20-4-60 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606; TEX. FAM. 
CODE §§ 785.021–027 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404 (LexisNexis 2017); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060; W. 
VA. CODE §§ 48-27-502–03; WIS. STAT. § 813.12; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (2017).  
Seven states do not provide specific relief for DV or abuse, but do provide injunctive relief 
prohibiting specific acts that result in physical harm.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-
105 (including the following forms of injunctive relief: prohibiting the abuser from causing 
bodily injury, sexually assaulting, harassing, touching, intimidating, or stalking the survivor); 
see also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6340–47; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. 
§ 600.2950; N.D. CENT. CODE 14-07.1-02 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2017); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5.  
 58  See supra note 53.   
 59  ALA. CODE § 30-5-7; ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602; ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-15-205; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6340–47; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-105; CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4; IDAHO CODE § 39-6306; 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 60/214; IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9; LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007; 
MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. LAW § 4-506; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
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“disturbing the peace” of the survivor,60 and eighteen states include an 
injunction against annoying or molesting the survivor as available forms of 
relief.61  Perhaps in light of the correlation between DV and animal abuse,62 
twenty-seven states include prohibitions against harming an animal or pet as 
a form of available injunctive relief.63  Only one state does not explicitly 
offer excluding the abuser from the survivor’s residence as a form of 
available relief.64  Additionally, thirteen state DVCPO statutes do not 
explicitly provide for an injunction against contacting the survivor.65 
2. Monetary Relief 
Monetary relief may include requiring the abuser to pay for the cost of 
property damaged or medical bills incurred and any court costs and fees as 
result of the abuse.66  The most common form of monetary relief included in 
state DVCPO statutes is a provision awarding attorney fees.67  Conversely, 
 
§ 33.030; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 842; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02; 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108; TEX. FAM. CODE § 785.027; WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.50.060; W. VA. CODE §§ 48-27-502–03.  
 60  CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6340–47; IDAHO CODE § 39-6306; MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924.  
 61  ALA. CODE § 30-5-7; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6340–47; 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-105; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; IDAHO CODE § 39-6306; IND. 
CODE § 34-26-5-2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 42-924; N.D. CENT. CODE 14-07.1-02; OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718; 15 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 15-5-3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60; TEX. FAM. CODE § 785.027.  
 62  The Animal Legal Defense Fund states that “abusers of animals are five times as likely 
to harm humans” and “nearly half of the [survivors] who stay in violent households do so 
because they are afraid for their animals.”  Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Cruelty and 
Domestic Violence, http://aldf.org/resources/when-your-companion-animal-has-been-harme
d/animal-cruelty-and-domestic-violence/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2018).   
 63  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205; CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203; 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-100; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2017); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214; IND. CODE § 34-26-5-2; IOWA 
CODE § 236.1 (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4001; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS SERV. § 400.501; MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.017; N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (2017); N.Y. FAM. LAW § 
842; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (LexisNexis 2017); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 107.718; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-10; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); TEX. FAM. 
CODE § 785.027; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-2791.1 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101; WIS. 
STAT. § 813.01 (2017).  
 64  See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4. 
 65  See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (2016); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 60/214; IOWA CODE § 236.5; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107; LA. STAT. ANN. § 
46:2136; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 
842; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-
10-5 (2017).   
 66  Johnson, supra note 2, at 1111 (explaining forms of monetary relief). 
 67  Twenty-three states have these provisions.  See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7; ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 13-3602; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6340–47; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
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only the New Jersey DV statute directly enumerates punitive damages and 
pain and suffering as available relief provisions.68  Three state DVCPO 
statutes, however, include broad provisions that allow for general “restitution 
relief,” therefore providing opportunities for survivors to recover costs 
associated with the abuse.69  Finally, eighteen state statutes do not provide 
monetary compensation for abuse-related costs, including neither court costs 
nor attorney fees.70 
3. Family and Support Related Relief 
Family and support related relief may include temporary child custody 
and visitation provisions; child or spousal support; and pet custody awards.71  
The most common form of statutory family-related relief is temporary child 
custody provisions.72  Twelve states do not include child support73 and 
seventeen states do not include spousal support74 as forms of statutory 
available relief.  Twenty-four states enumerate pet custody as a form of 
 
10, § 1045 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4; IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (2017); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 60/214; IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9; IOWA CODE § 236.5; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107; LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 46:2136; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2017); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:25-29; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 842; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 
(2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.50.060 (2017). 
 68  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (2017).  
 69  CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6340–47; MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2016); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-27-
502–03 (2017). 
 70  COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-105 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 586-4 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (LexisNexis 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. 
§ 600.2950; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2017); N.D. 
CENT. CODE 14-07.1-02 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4; 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (2015); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§25-10-5; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE § 785.027 (West 2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404 (LexisNexis 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2017); 
WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017).  
 71  Johnson, supra note 2, at 1111 (explaining forms of family-related relief). 
 72  Only seven states do not directly include child custody adjudication provisions as 
forms of available relief.  See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602; FLA. STAT. § 741.30; 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, 
§ 60.4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404; WIS. STAT. § 813.12. 
 73  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-105; HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-
4; IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 40-15-201; NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924; N.D. CENT. CODE 14-07.1-02; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 
60.4; OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404; WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.50.010 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 813.12. 
 74  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-105; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-
15 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4; IDAHO CODE § 39-6306; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
403.740; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 42-924; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 842 (Consol. 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4; OR. REV. 
STAT. § 107.718; 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-13; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404; VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060; WIS. STAT. § 813.12.   
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available DVCPO relief.75  Five state DVCPO laws, however, do not provide 
any form of family relief.76 
4. Additional Relief and Duration 
Additional relief provisions can include parenting skills classes, 
batterer treatment programs, substance abuse testing and treatment 
programs, Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, and a general 
provision granting additional necessary relief.77  The most common form of 
additional relief available is requiring the abuser to complete DV counseling 
or a batterer intervention program.78  Least common is allowing GPS 
tracking of DV abusers79 and requiring the abuser to undergo a medical or 
psychological examination.80  Additionally, twenty-six states permit the 
courts to award survivors possession of property.81  Many state DVCPO 
 
 75  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602; ARK. CODE ANN. § 
9-15-205 (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6340–6347 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-
105; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.5 
(2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007 (2017); MD. CODE 
ANN.  FAM. LAW § 4-506 (LexisNexis 2017); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 33.030 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 
(2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31; S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-4-60 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606; TEX. FAM. CODE § 71.027; VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, § 1103; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060; W. VA. CODE 
§§ 48-27-502–03 (2017).  
 76  MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 60.4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404; WIS. STAT. § 813.12. 
 77  Stoever, supra note 14, at 1044 (explaining different forms of additional relief).   
 78  Sixteen states do not directly include a provision for counseling or treatment.  ALA. 
CODE § 30-5-7 (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-
105; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2017); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924; 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030; N.Y. FAM. LAW § 842; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 610 (2017); 15 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-13; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103; 
WIS. STAT. § 813.12.   
 79  Only five state DVCPO statutes provide this form of relief.  IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9; 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740; LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 
(2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060.  
 80  Only three states expressly permit required medical or psychiatric evaluations as a 
form of relief.  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29; LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 46:2136.  
 81  See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7; ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 
6340–47 (West 2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (2017); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (2016); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-26-
5-9; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107; LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136; ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007 
(2017); MD. CODE ANN.  FAM. LAW § 4-506 (LexisNexis 2017); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 
(2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 173-B:5 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (2017); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (LexisNexis 2017); 23 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE § 785.027 (West 
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060; W. VA. CODE §§ 
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statutes include a general additional relief provision that permits the court to 
order any relief necessary to protect the survivor from DV.82  Finally, state 
statutory duration provisions dramatically vary—ranging from 180 days83 to 
indefinite orders of protection.84 
IV. PROPOSED NATIONAL UNIFORM, EXPANSIVE DVCPO LAW 
As the most utilized remedy for DV survivors, DVCPOs should be 
available to all survivors who need protection and should be responsive to 
individual needs.85  Allowing all DV survivors access to a wide range of 
relief options will greatly benefit both survivors86 and our communities.87  
But, with varying statutory definitions of DV and available relief, the 
“nation’s CPO laws largely fail to provide a remedy” for many survivors of 
DV.88  Thus, to better address DV, we must “remove the barriers that prevent 
 
48-27-502–03 (2017). 
 82  Twelve states do not include a general, additional relief provision.  See GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 19-13-4; IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
209A, § 3; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (2017); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 455.050; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02; 15 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-13; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
1103. 
 83  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-404. 
 84  Fourteen states allow potentially indefinite DVCPO.  See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7; 
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-105; FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2017); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950; MISS. CODE ANN. § 
93-21-15; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
40-13-1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02; OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (2015); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 1103; WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060.  Some states provide different durations 
for different protection order provisions.  For example, Alaska provides a potentially 
indefinite order for the injunction against abuse, but a one-year maximum duration for all 
other provisions.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100.  
 85  Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to 
Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 303, 321 (2011) [hereinafter 
Stoever2] (“Because the protection order is the remedy most utilized and available to 
[survivors], and in light of its potential effectiveness, it is important that this remedy be 
available to survivors who need to seek help from the court over time and that courts respond 
to individual survivors’ needs.”).   
 86   Expanding legal options can help survivors disrupt the power and control dynamic in 
their relationships and promote survivor empowerment.  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1151–
64.  Additionally, without a DVCPO, some DV survivors can be “denied other forms of legal 
relief affecting their family status, immigration status, and welfare status, among other 
effects.”  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1152–53.   
 87  See Dana Harrington Conner, Symposium Article: VAWA 20-Where Do We Go from 
Here? Protection Order Duration: Proof, Procedural Issues, and Policy Considerations, 24 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 343, 369 (2015) (“Affording relief to the greatest number of 
individuals who are in need of, and desire, civil protection promotes the overall health and 
welfare of our community.”).   
 88  See generally Johnson, supra note 2, at 1115; see supra Part III for an analysis of 
different state DVCPO relationship requirements, act requirements, and relief options.  See 
also Baker, supra note 3, at 34 (“Defining ‘abuse’ is central to civil protection regimes 
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[survivors] who desire the full protection of this remedy from getting these 
orders.”89  Ultimately, “our best hope to do so requires strong public policy 
against domestic violence . . . and begins with appropriate legislation to that 
end.”90  This Part argues for a uniform, inclusive, and expansive DVCPO 
law across the United States that provides individualized relief to every 
survivor experiencing any form of DV. 
A. A Uniform, Expansive DVCPO Law Will Better Protect DV 
Survivors 
The current fragmented system of DVCPO laws leaves some DV 
survivors without any form of relief and some survivors without the specific 
relief that they desperately need.  When the legal system does not provide 
access to nuanced, individualized protection, “the legal system fails 
survivors and may even place them in increased danger.”91  Conversely, by 
providing the opportunity to receive expansive and individualized relief, 
more survivors may both seek and obtain orders of protection.92  A uniform, 
expansive DVCPO law across the United States is needed to eliminate 
disparate state treatment of DV and better protect all survivors. 
 
 
 
 
because a court may not issue a protection order without finding that abuse has occurred or is 
likely to occur.”).   
 89  Murphy, supra note 27, at 514.  
 90  HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at v; see also Keilitz, supra note 14, at 79.   
 91  Stoever2, supra note 85, at 376; see also Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based 
Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between “The Truly National and the Truly Local, 42 B.C. L. 
REV. 1081, 1135 (2001) (“Most immediately, [survivors] denied effective protection from 
violence are placed in a dangerous situation.”).  Many scholars assert that an individualized 
response requires civil protection order laws to provide and award relief in a way that does 
not force a survivor to unwillingly separate from the abuser.  See Goldfarb2, supra note 17, 
at 1489 (“Until domestic violence law recognizes and accommodates the desire of many [DV 
survivors] to remain in their relationships, it cannot be considered truly successful.”); Tamara 
L. Kuennen, Love Matters, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 978, 1010–14 (2014) (hereinafter Kuennen2) 
(noting that the law should provide protection within the context of love, rather than 
separation); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist 
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 557–58 (1992) 
[hereinafter Schneider2]. 
 92  Studies show that only a small minority of survivors actually seek protection orders.  
See Jordan, supra note 18, at 1426.  Additionally, survivors “choose not to engage the state 
because, once they do, their opinion as to what would be the best outcome for them is often 
ignored.”  Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Movement: 
From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 145, 1165 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson2].  
Therefore, survivors may be “more willing to seek an order if we can tailor it to fit [their] 
need[s].”  Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 1525.   
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1. Defining “Domestic”: A Broad Definition of Domestic 
Relationships 
Many states fail to provide relief for DV survivors by conditioning 
relief upon narrow definitions of qualifying DV relationships.93  Historically, 
many states provided relief only for survivors in a legal marital 
relationship.94  Today, many states now define relationships among a 
“marriage-mimicry model” and provide relief only to past or present marital 
relationships, intimate relationships, or relationships where the victim and 
abuser share a household.95  Unfortunately, this model leaves many DV 
survivors without protection.96 
Different statutory definitions of qualifying relationships also result in 
dramatically different results for similarly situated DV survivors across the 
United States.97  For example, in Massachusetts, a survivor who shares a 
child in common with his/her abuser meets the relationship requirement to 
receive a DVCPO, even if he/she did not have a dating relationship or family 
relationship with the abuser.98  Just a few miles away in New Hampshire, 
however, the same survivor may not be able to obtain a DVCPO.  New 
Hampshire’s statute does not explicitly provide relief for survivors who 
share a child in common; rather, the survivor and abuser must have been or 
currently be family members, household members, or in a dating 
 
 93  See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 227; Smith, supra note 18, at 96 (“While many 
states have expanded their definitions of the types of relationships that qualify for protection, 
too many states still deny protection to [survivor]s in dating relationships, cohabitation 
relationships, same-sex relationships, and other domestic relationships.”).  See also supra Part 
III for an overview of state statutory relationship definitions.   
 94  See Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1841, 1845, 1881 (2006).  Upon recognition that DV occurred outside of the 
traditional marital unit, states began to expand the types of qualifying relationships.  See 
Justine A. Dunlap, Soft Misogyny: The Subtle Perversion of Domestic Violence “Reform,” 46 
SETON HALL L. REV. 775, 783 (2016).   
 95  See Colker, supra note 94, at 1849–50.   
 96  See Colker, supra note 94, at 1881 (“[T]he following people have been left under-
protected under their state domestic violence law: (1) [persons] who have gone on a few dates 
with their abuser but did not enter long-term relationships; (2) [persons] who have maintained 
separate residences from their abusers; (3) [persons] who have been abused by [persons] who 
are married to [someone else]; (4) [persons] who sublet a room in a boarding house or an 
apartment with an abuser; (5) pregnant women who do not live with the abusers who are the 
fathers of the potential child[ren]; and (6) [persons] in various family situations that do not 
include marriage or blood ties, such as a widow of the defendant’s brother, stepmother, 
maternal grandfather, former stepdaughter, former girlfriend, and various college students.”). 
 97  See Conner, supra note 87, at 344 (“[I]n some jurisdictions a select group of domestic 
abuse [survivor]s receive a maximum level of protection at the expense of a larger class of 
survivors who are in need of safeguards, regardless of how brief.  In other jurisdictions, a 
greater number of individuals receive minimum protections only.”).   
 98  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017). 
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relationship.99 
Even though some advocates limit the definition of DV to intimate 
partners,100 it is important to have expansive definitions to include all 
“domestic relationships.”  Without expanding the definition of DV beyond 
intimate partner relationships, many survivors will be unable to obtain legal 
relief.  Therefore, a uniform DVCPO law that broadly defines qualifying 
domestic relationships is needed to better protect DV survivors.  Qualifying 
relationships should include those currently recognized by state statutes: 
current and former sexual, romantic, marital, or dating partners; family 
relationships by marriage or blood; household members; persons who share 
a child in common or are pregnant; and other relationships that the court 
deems should be included as “domestic violence” relationships.101 
2. Defining “Violence”: An Expansive Act Requirement 
Currently about half of state statutes fail to provide relief for some DV 
survivors by conditioning relief upon a finding of physical violence or crimes 
related to physical harm.102  DV, however, is more than just physical 
violence;103 rather, it is a pattern of behavior used by the abuser to exert 
power and control over the survivor.104  Statutes that define DV as solely 
physical violence consequently neither acknowledge nor provide relief for 
survivors experiencing only non-physical forms of DV.105 
 
 99  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017). 
 100  See, e.g., Snyder & Morgan, supra note 2, at 2 n.2 (“‘Domestic violence’ occurs when 
one intimate partner uses physical violence, threats, stalking, harassment, or emotional or 
financial abuse to control, manipulate, coerce, or intimidate the other partner.”).   
 101  See supra Part III.A for an overview of the different state relationship requirements.   
 102  See supra note 50.  See also Johnson, supra note 2, at 1129 (“[T]he vast majority of 
jurisdictions’ CPO laws do not remedy domestic violence unless it is physically abusive or a 
criminal act.”).  
 103  See Baker, supra note 3, at 44 (“Physical violence is a symptom, not the disease, of 
domestic abuse.  The disease is a dangerous, coercive imbalance of power and control within 
the intimate relationship.”); see also Baker, supra note 3, at 65 (“An abuser may seek to 
control his partner through emotional, psychological, social, financial, cultural, and personal 
means that are not physically violent and that are not illegal.”). 
 104  Other areas of law broadly define DV.  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1156 
(“Immigration, welfare, tort, and divorce laws recognize domestic violence that is broader 
than only severe physical violence and crimes.  Many of these laws recognize that domestic 
violence is usually situated in a relationship permeated with oppressive power and the exercise 
of control.”).  Some states recognize the need to include an expansive definition of DV.  See, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-100 (2017) (“The general assembly further finds and declares 
that domestic abuse is not limited to physical threats of violence and harm but also includes 
mental and emotional abuse, financial control, document control, property control, and other 
types of control that make a [survivor] more likely to return to an abuser due to fear of 
retaliation or inability to meet basic needs.”). 
 105  See Baker, supra note 3, at 44–45 (“The focus on physical violence misses the greater 
dynamic present in abusive, intimate relationships.”).   
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By limiting the qualifying abuse to acts that cause physical harm, many 
states place survivors in more danger because they have to wait for an 
experience of physical abuse before they are able to access a civil protection 
order.106  Conversely, by providing protection to DV survivors who have not 
experienced physical abuse, a DVCPO order may ultimately decrease non-
physical abuse107 and potentially prevent physical abuse from occurring by 
changing the control dynamic in the relationship and stopping the escalation 
of abuse.108  A more inclusive definition of abuse may therefore result in 
enormous safety benefits by allowing more survivors to both successfully 
file for and receive the protection they need.109  Additionally, a broad 
definition of abuse more accurately reflects and embodies the experiences of 
DV survivors by acknowledging all forms of DV. 110  Therefore, a uniform 
law that broadly defines DV111 to include psychological or emotional abuse, 
stalking, harassment, and financial abuse112 is needed to better protect DV 
 
 106  Baker, supra note 3, at 65 (“[Survivor]s of domestic abuse must await violence before 
availing themselves of the law.”).  Additionally, a narrow definition of abuse focused on 
physical violence, may result in judge-made standards that award relief only to the most 
serious cases of physical injury or harm.  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1114.   
 107  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1113.   
 108  See Baker, supra note 3, at 58 (“By providing a cause of action for abuse [survivors] 
who have not yet, or not recently, been [survivors] of physical violence, these [survivors] 
might break the cycle of escalating violence and seek liberation before a coercive, abusive 
relationship becomes inevitably violent.”); Johnson, supra note 2, at 1113 (“Because CPOs 
are potentially effective in decreasing nonphysical abuse, CPOs can also potentially change 
the dangerous power dynamics of a relationship before physical abuse is inflicted.”).   
 109  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1140.   
 110  See Schneider2, supra note 91, at 538 (noting that a broad definition is more inclusive 
and accurate to the survivor’s experiences).  
 111  See Johnson2, supra note 92; Smith, supra note 18, at 150 (“Each state should expand 
its civil protection order laws to ensure that all [survivors] and all types of domestic violence 
are covered.”); Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 1530–40 (asserting that harassment, threats, 
stalking, property crimes, financial abuse, sexual violence, and emotional/psychological 
abuse should be included in the definition of DV.); see also BREIDING ET AL., supra note 15 
(noting that survivors of emotional abuse should be able to obtain relief through DVCPO law 
because emotional abuse can intensify the damaging impact of other forms of DV, emotional 
abuse has just as significant—if not more—of an impact than physical abuse, and emotional 
abuse is often a precursor to physical and sexual forms of violence).  One proposed method 
for broadly defining DV that includes all forms of DV is to premise the definition on a gender-
neutral concept of coercive control.  See Kristy Candela, Note, Protecting the Invisible Victim: 
Incorporating Coercive Control in Domestic Violence Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112, 118 
(2016) (“Coercive control is a kind of ‘catch all’ for nonphysical abuse, encompassing 
multiple types of abuse, such as emotional, psychological, and economic.”).   
 112  Many states may not currently provide protection for non-physical forms of abuse 
because of “the fear of fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of proof offered, and the difficulty 
of setting up any satisfactory boundaries.”  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. 
b (1965); Leonard Karp & Laura C. Belleau, The Federalization of Family Law: Family Law 
and Domestic Violence: The Legacy of the Violence Against Women Act, 16 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 173 (1999).  Although a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, the “floodgate” concerns may be partially assuaged by providing judges with 
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survivors.113 
3. Relief Provisions: Expansive Forms of Available Relief 
Many DV survivors are not awarded the relief that they believe they 
need.114  This may be due in part to disparities in DVCPO laws across the 
United States where many states provide limited options for legal relief.115  
For example, in Massachusetts DV survivors may receive many forms of 
relief, including: eviction of the abuser from the shared residence; restitution 
for damages related to the abuse such as medical expenses, lost wages, and 
damaged property; attorney’s fees related to the abuse; and any other 
additional relief necessary to protect the survivor.116  Conversely, that relief 
is not statutorily available in New Hampshire.117  A uniform DVCPO law 
across the United States that permits expansive options for relief is therefore 
needed to allow survivors to receive individualized and comprehensive 
protection.118 
 
 
 
 
appropriate training so that they can better identify and understand different forms of DV.  
See Abigail Hall, Ending Intimate Partner Homicide: A Call for Reform of Kansas Protective 
Order Statutes, 63 KAN. L. REV. 1087, 1110 (2015) (“With proper training, judges will obtain 
the tools to understand [DV] and identify the abuse when it exists.  Judges will know and 
appreciate that just because a [survivor] does not leave an abusive relationship does not mean 
that the abuse is nonexistent or benign.  Judges will understand that there are many ways to 
abuse someone, and no form of abuse is consistently less powerful than any other.  This 
knowledge will provide the judges the ability to better identify abusive relationships and work 
to offer all possible legal protections.”); Sarah A. Herman, Comment, A Difference in 
Perceptions: The Final Report of the North Dakota Commission on Gender Fairness in the 
Courts, Submitted to the North Dakota Supreme Court by the North Dakota Commission on 
Gender Fairness in the Courts, October 10, 1996, 72 N.D. L. REV. 1113, 1247 (1996) (“The 
topic of domestic violence and protection orders—including information about the abuse 
dynamic, the dangers of misplaced emphasis on [survivor] actions, failure to respect 
[survivor] concerns, and the prevention of domestic violence—should be addressed in 
education programs for judges, prosecutors and other attorneys, court personnel, and law 
enforcement officers.”). 
 113  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1115 (“A broader approach will allow the CPO laws to 
better assist [survivors] seeking to change abusive relationships.”)  
 114  See, e.g., Gondolf, supra note 20, at 510–11 (noting that in the study conducted, only 
12% of requests for financial support, 52% of requests for child custody, 53% of requests for 
child visitation, and 52% of no contact requests were granted).  
 115  See supra Part III.C for an analysis of different types of relief offered by state DVCPO 
laws.   
 116  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2017). 
 117  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (2017).  Additionally, the New Hampshire DVCPO 
statute does not include a general provision allowing courts to award additional necessary 
relief.  Id.  
 118  Johnson, supra note 2, at 1154.   
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Additionally, the nature of the self-driven DVCPO legal process 
warrants expansive, individualized relief.119  Broad and flexible relief meets 
the goals and design of DVCPO legislation and the DV legal movement.120  
Expansive and individualized options for relief foster survivor autonomy, 
decision-making, empowerment, and control—which are key aims of 
DVCPO laws.121  A nuanced and flexible approach is necessary to address 
the complex, unique circumstances of DV relationships.122  Survivor 
empowerment and autonomy through the DVCPO process can shift the 
power balance in the relationship,123 decrease violence,124 and help survivors 
regain that which has been taken by or lost to their abusers.125  Broad relief 
 
 119  In DVCPO proceedings, the survivor is the “prosecuting party” who seeks a “specific 
remedy, tailored to [his/her] unique needs and circumstances.”  Wright, supra note 19, at 679.  
Therefore, “[b]ecause protection orders are civil, private rights of action, [survivors] who file 
protection orders must by definition be afforded greater autonomy and decision-making.”  
Kuennen, supra note 2, at 88.   
 120  See Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding?  
Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 517, 553 (2010) (“Advocates and legislators support protection order statutes in order 
to provide survivors with . . . broader and more flexible relief.”); Kuennen, supra note 2, at 
87 (noting that the reformers and advocates designed the system with the awareness that 
survivors need “individualized relief tailored to their particular needs” in direct contrast to the 
relief available in criminal cases); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Domestic Violence and the 
Politics of Self-Help, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 214 (2016) (“Activists wanted 
[DV survivors] to have more access, agency and control over remedies for domestic violence 
than those available through criminal responses.”).   
 121  See Wright, supra note 19, at 679 (“The aim of justice interventions for [DV], 
including the implementation of protective orders, are to ensure safety and empower 
[survivors] to gain some control in managing conflict.”); see also Einat Peled, Zvi Eisikovits, 
Guy Enosh, & Zeev Wintok, Choice and Empowerment for Battered Women Who Stay: 
Toward a Constructivist Model, 45 SOC. WORK 9, 19 (2000) (“Having a sense of the 
availability of multiple options is empowering in and of itself and fosters the experience of 
choice.”); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-1 (LexisNexis 2010) (The purposes of the DVCPO law 
include: “[t]o assure [survivors] of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse 
that the law can provide” and “[t]o create a flexible and speedy remedy. . . .”).   
 122  See Conner, supra note 87, at 369 (“[Domestic] violence affects a diverse group of 
individuals.  Each survivor is unique and mandates a personalized approach to protection. . . . 
In an effort to provide better protections for those who choose to engage with the civil 
protection system, a broad range of options must be made available that reflect the unique 
circumstances of battered persons. . . . Pre-conceptions about what is best for all survivors of 
domestic violence present safety risks, conflict with survivor autonomy, and run contrary to 
the civil system of protection.”); Schneider, supra note 2, at 363 (“[W]e need legal solutions 
that are sufficiently nuanced to recognize the violence as well as the human connections.”).  
 123  Stoever2, supra note 85, at 320.  
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. (“When [survivors] are able to self-direct, self-define, exercise agency, and exert 
autonomy—as the civil protection order process should encourage them to do—they can shift 
the power in the relationship, reconstruct or exit relationships, and decrease violence in their 
lives.”); see also Baker, supra note 3, at 57 (“Instead, civil protection regimes generate relief 
to violence [survivors] by affording them a lever to demand or regain power, or to be liberated 
from coercive oppression, by communicating defiance, by seizing a power greater than the 
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options may also better protect survivors by making them “less vulnerable 
to violence and its consequences,”126 and by enhancing DVCPO 
enforcement.127  Therefore, there should be a uniform DVCPO law that 
provides all forms of relief currently available in state statutes,128 including: 
indefinite orders of protection;129 housing relief;130 temporary child custody 
 
abuser’s in the law, and by exposing her oppression publicly.”).  DVCPO laws should 
therefore “support, rather than undermine, [survivors’] role as autonomous decision-makers” 
by providing expansive, individualized, nuanced relief.  Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 1489 
(noting that the legal system should seek to restore and reinforce those qualities lost as a result 
of the abuse, while avoiding measures that revictimize the survivor).   
 126  Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 15 (“Laws that ensure [DV survivors] access to 
employment, housing, health care, economic security, and other resources will strengthen 
[DV survivors’] position[s] in society and thereby render them less vulnerable to violence and 
its consequences.”).   
 127  More specific relief awards better protect victims because defendants understand what 
conduct is not permitted and law enforcement officers understand what to enforce.  See 
Keilitz, supra note 14, at 80; see also Barbara Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: 
Analysis, Commentary, and Recommendations, reprinted in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 224 (2d ed. 2008) (“For orders to be effective, they must be 
comprehensive; crafted to the particular safety needs of the [survivor] in each case.”).   
 128  See supra Part III.C for an overview of available statutory relief.   
 129  DVCPO laws should provide an option for indefinite orders of protection because 
indefinite orders can “increase survivors’ safety and autonomy while saving them from having 
to reengage with an abusive partner to extend the order.”  Stoever, supra note 14, at 1022.  
 130  DVCPO laws should also provide housing relief, where survivors are able to exclude 
the abusers from their residences or receive financial contributions from the abusers to find 
alternate housing if the survivors choose to leave the shared residences.  See Johnson2, supra 
note 92, at 196.   
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provisions;131 financial support and maintenance;132 monetary damages;133 
and a general additional relief provision.134 
B. DV Is a National Concern That Warrants a National Response 
As a “pervasive and serious social problem”135 and a “national 
 
 131  Custody provisions help reduce the possibility of abuse or conflict over custody issues 
and can empower survivors to become independent of the abusers.  See Keilitz, supra note 
14, at 81 (noting that custody provisions offer greater protection for both the female abuse 
survivor and her children and reduce opportunities for abuse or conflict over custody 
disputes); Carolyn N. Ko, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved 
Question of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 361, 387 (2002) (“The custody issue needs 
to be addressed to reduce the continued abuse of [parents].”); Nina W. Tarr, Promoting Justice 
Through Interdisciplinary Teaching, Practice, and Scholarship Civil Orders for Protection: 
Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 157, 171 (2003) (“Many batterers 
recognize that an easy way to maintain control of a [survivor] is to frighten [him/her] with the 
threat of losing [his/her] children.”).  Custody provisions can also provide survivors with more 
time to seek a final order of custody or support.  See Conner, supra note 88, at 368 (“This 
duration provides the protected person with time to develop a safety plan, seek legal advice, 
and decide whether to seek a more permanent order from the court on matters of custody, 
visitation, support, divorce, and property division.”).  Finally, DVCPO custody provisions 
may be more effective than custody orders obtained through custody or divorce actions 
because violation of the DVCPO triggers an immediate law enforcement response. 
 131   See Weissman, supra note 91, at 1135–36.   
 132  Financial support and maintenance should be statutorily available forms of relief in 
order to enable financially dependent or economically disadvantaged survivors to receive 
necessary monetary support.  See Stoever2, supra note 85, at 371.  Additionally, many 
survivors “frequently need immediate financial relief to enable them to leave an abusive 
household, meet basic survival needs, and create a home apart from an abusive partner . . . .” 
Id.   
 133  Monetary damages should be available, including—but not limited to—damages for 
destruction of property, lost wages, and medical expenses in order to hold the abuser 
responsible for the costs of his abuse.  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1155 (“[M]onetary 
damages should be available for the injuries to which [survivors] are subjected from their 
abuse.  Such monetary damages are not only important for the resulting harm from physical 
injuries and the emotional and psychological abuse, but also can be tailored to address the 
harm from economic abuse . . . .”). 
 134  Id. at 1155–56 (“It is also important to provide a range of CPO remedies so that they 
can be context specific. DVCPO laws will offer the greatest benefit, therefore, if they provide 
a remedy that includes a catch-all phrase, such as ‘any other relief that would address the 
domestic violence,’ that permits the [survivor] to seek a remedy crafted to [his/her] particular 
situation, [his/her] knowledge of the abuse, and [his/her] understanding of the best way to 
address it.”).   
 135  Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 55 (2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf; see also William G. Bassler, The 
Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise of Cooperative Federalism or a 
Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1139, 1159 (1996) (“The 
enormity of domestic violence as a social problem requires a response at all levels of 
government—national, state, and local.”); Ron Cooper, Lack of State Accountability in Acts 
of Domestic Violence: Understanding the Contrast Between the U.S. and International 
Approaches, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 657, 689 (2012) (“Whatever the difficulty, the U.S. 
government needs to take the next step in domestic violence advocacy . . . .”); David M. Fine, 
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epidemic,”136 DV “mandate[s] national intervention.”137  National legal 
recognition of DV through a uniform DVCPO law can transform how DV is 
addressed because the national legal system can be a vehicle for social 
change.138  As a “nation of laws” the citizenry is committed to the law in 
such a way that the legal system is a powerful force in society.139  The law’s 
“symbolic function in setting standards of right and wrong, as well as the 
power to incarcerate, impose other remedies, and allocate resources, make 
the legal arena a crucial site for initiatives to improve a country’s response 
to [DV].”140 
 
 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Proper Federal Role in Policing Domestic 
Violence, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 252, 300 (1998) (“Domestic violence is a problem of national 
proportion.”); Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 3 (“The law should do all it can to designate [DV] 
as a serious public concern that requires a commitment of public attention and resources.”).  
 136  Kerri E. Maloney, Gender Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil 
Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 
1878 (1996). 
 137  Id. at 1878; Rep. of the Group of Experts on Violence Against Women, U.N. Div. for 
the Advancement of Women, (May 2005), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-
gp-2005/docs/FINALREPORT.goodpractices.pdf (“[DV] must be addressed on multiple 
levels and in multiple sectors of society simultaneously, taking direction from local people on 
how women’s rights may be promoted in a given context.”)  In 2015, President Barack Obama 
recognized the severity of DV and the necessity of a larger response by stating, “we recommit 
to doing everything in our power to uphold the basic human right to be free from violence and 
abuse” and “we all have a responsibility to try to end this grave problem.”  Proclamation No. 
60263, 80 Fed. Reg. 60027, 60263 (Oct. 5, 2015). 
 138  See Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 1535 (“In addition to their effect on [survivors] and 
perpetrators, protection orders can also have an impact on society as a whole.  Law has 
enormous capacity to change social norms.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., Battered Women 
& Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, 10 J. L. POL’Y 313, 343 (2002) [hereinafter 
Schneider3]  (“Obviously, law is an important and sometimes necessary instrument in the 
sense that it can facilitate the translation of a social problem into a subject of public concern 
and even public responsibility that provides citizens with an entitlement to public care, 
concern, protection or support.”); see also Aiken, supra note 25, at 150 (“[The Battered 
Women’s Movement advocates] saw recognition in the law as a way of accomplishing 
multiple objectives at once including bringing domestic violence into the national spotlight, 
conveying a message of support to [survivors], and making clear that battering was simply 
unacceptable.”).   
 139  See Schneider3, supra note 138, at 349–50 (“We do not have anything else to appeal 
as a source of our commonality or our national identity.  We have this phrase—it is a sexist 
phrase, but it is still useful—’We are a nation of laws, not men.’”); see also Goldfarb, supra 
note 11, at 3 (“Legal practices should increase public awareness that [DV] is unacceptable 
and should contribute to a sense of public responsibility for solving the problem.”).  
 140  Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 2.  A national response provides many important benefits, 
including the ability to “address common solutions to widely shared problems” and “speak 
with greater moral authority” than responses through only state and local governments.  Ann 
L. Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 267, 333 (2009) (“Because Congress is a national forum, it represents a wider 
cross-section of values and interests than most state legislatures.  Because it acts for the nation, 
Congress is in a unique position to determine and implement common solutions.”).  
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A national response is needed to challenge and correct the pervasive 
misconception of DV as a distant, private matter.141  In United States v. 
Morrison, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal civil rights 
remedy for gender-motivated violence in the Violence Against Women Act 
[VAWA] was an unconstitutional use of Congress’s Article III Commerce 
Clause Power.142  The Court famously stated, “[t]he Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”143  In this 
way, the Morrison decision “served to divest violence against women of its 
systemic character, and belies a common view that claims of gender-based 
violence are more anecdotal than structural, more idiosyncratic than 
institutional.”144 
The misconception of DV as a solely private, family problem continues 
to perpetrate every level of our society and legal system.  In state courts, the 
legal culture “is infused with the belief that problems of [DV are] 
inappropriate for judicial resolution.”145  Also, many state judges do not 
understand the complexity of DV.146  They base decisions on common public 
misperceptions and ultimately perpetuate a “widely held anti-victim bias.”147  
Unfortunately, DV survivors suffer as a result of this legal culture.148  For 
 
 141  See Palmer, supra note 7 at 103 (noting that a local response to DV “contributes to the 
misperception of domestic violence as isolated instances.”).   
 142  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8, cl. 3.  
 143  Morrison, 59 U.S. at 617–18.   
 144  Weissman, supra note 91, at 1085.   
 145  Id. at 1093; see also id. at 1085 (“[T]he state courts shun these cases by curtailing the 
hearing process, thereby reducing them to quasi-judicial controversies, or consigning them 
outside of the legal system altogether.”).  Judicial attitudes about the significance of DV are 
related to views of family law in general.  See Palmer, supra note 7, at 158 (“Family court is 
held in such low esteem among the judicial community that judges rarely choose to be 
assigned there; instead, many sit on the family court bench after being promised that they will 
be promoted to general civil or criminal divisions after one term.”).   
 146  See Kuennen, supra note 2, at 45 (“In addition, the psychological dynamics of 
domestic violence are complex, and judges are not provided with sufficient time, information 
or training to be able to adequately address them.  Judges become frustrated with [survivors] 
who appear to want to stay in abusive relationships, with batterers who appear to flout court 
orders, and with the problem of domestic violence generally.  Finally, judges may assume that 
[DV survivors], by definition, are unable to make rational decisions with regard to what is in 
their best interest.  These factors may inappropriately skew judicial decision-making.”); 
Palmer, supra note 7, at 158–59 (“For example, there is evidence that some judges 
misconstrue domestic violence as an isolated, private matter—one relating to ‘personality 
flaws, relationships gone bad, anger and jealousy’—as opposed to a cyclical, dangerous 
relationship worthy of a thoughtful, long-term judicial remedy.  Without judicial education, 
some judges also fail to see the complex financial, social, cultural and political issues outside 
of a given relationship that may encourage a [DV survivor] to stay with an abusive partner, 
or that may make it incredibly difficult for her to leave.”). 
 147  Epstein, supra note 25, at 6.  
 148  Weissman, supra note 91, at 1115 (“Domestic violence cases suffer as a result of the 
courts’ general dislike for matters involving personal problems.”); see also Weissman, supra 
note 91, at 1111 (“The historic belief that domestic violence matters have no legitimate place 
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example, “[t]he beliefs that domestic violence issues are less important, 
private, and not the courts’ concerns are often related to and expressed as 
biases of judges, affecting the outcome of each case.”149  Some survivors 
report very disturbing behavior and commentary from state judges, including 
one judge stating, “if you go back one more time I’ll hit you myself.”150  
Further action is needed to “correct the inferior treatment of domestic 
violence” and reestablish a commitment to addressing and preventing DV.151  
By recognizing DV as a public issue, a national response may encourage 
increased action to directly address it in a way that will better protect and 
support DV survivors.152 
Finally, the federal government has historically recognized the 
importance of a national response to DV by directly enacting legislation to 
combat it.153  In 1984 Congress enacted the Family Violence Prevention and 
Service Act (FVPSA)154 and in 1994 Congress enacted VAWA.155  VAWA 
 
in the courts is centrally implicated in the failure of the legal system to address them.”).   
 149  Weissman, supra note 91, at 1118.   
 150  Herman, supra note 112, at 1208.  Another judge stated, “you’re taking away the three 
most important things in his life: his home, children, and wife.  Are you sure you want to do 
this?”  Id. at 1208.  Finally, another judge stated to a survivor, “[s]omeday you will realize 
this is all your fault.”  Id.  
 151  Stoever, supra note 14, at 1087.   
 152  See Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 1507 (“Laws that provide for broad coverage and 
comprehensive relief offer the most benefits to domestic violence [survivors].”); see also 
Cooper, supra note 135, at 686 (“Viewing domestic violence as a public issue that threatens 
the health and safety of millions of Americans each year could lead to legislative changes 
aimed at providing the necessary support and outreach [survivors] need.”).  Additionally, 
some DV survivors want the legal system to be a public forum and a loudspeaker that will 
catch the attention of the abusers.  See Fischer & Rose, supra note 19, at 420 (“[S]ome 
[survivors] emphasize the need to have the law act, in one form or another, as a ‘loudspeaker’.  
The law was deliberately chosen because it was the only form of communication to which the 
abuser would listen, guaranteeing that the message would be heard.”).  Survivors want and 
need a systemic legal response that “holds the perpetrators accountable.”  Keilitz, supra note 
14, at 80 (“These orders invoke the court’s authority to advise the perpetrator that domestic 
violence is unacceptable and to provide sanctions for further abuse or threats of violence.”).  
In this way, a strong, integrated message through a uniform, expansive DVCPO law can better 
meet the needs of survivors and intensify the current positive effects of DVCPO laws. 
 153  ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42838, FAMILY 
VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND SERVICES ACT (FVPSA): BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 1 (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42838.pdf. 
 154  See Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401–21 (2012).  
FVPSA provides funding for: (1) the creation and maintenance of a national DV hotline and 
DV service database; (2) direct services to survivors and families by funding different 
organizations and services—including legal advocacy; and (3) prevention campaigns and 
strategies.  For more information about FVPSA, see generally Family Violence Prevention 
and Services Act, NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://nnedv.org/policy/
issues/fvpsa.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2018).   
 155  See Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13925–14045 (2012).  VAWA is 
considered the “first comprehensive legislation effort to create a national response to the 
epidemic of violence against women.”  Robin R. Runge, The Evolution of a National 
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and FVPSA “demonstrate the importance of a national response that 
provides consistent legal protections and substantial targeted funding for 
legal and social services.”156  VAWA and FVPSA improved institutional and 
societal attitudes toward DV,157 by relocating DV from a local to a national 
forum and acknowledging DV as a national problem.158 
As President Barack Obama recognized, however, “though we have 
made great progress in bringing awareness to and providing protections 
against domestic violence, much work remains to be done.”159  The 
continued prevalence and severity of DV in the United States “reflects as 
much a failure of our Nation’s collective willingness to confront the problem 
as it does the failure of the Nation’s law and regulations.  Both our resolve 
and our laws must change if [DV survivors] are to lead free and equal 
lives.”160  Without a national recommitment to DV, the problems in DV law 
will continue.161 
 
 
 
Response to Violence Against Women, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 429 (2013).  Since its 
creation, VAWA has been continuously reauthorized to fund a variety of state legal, 
educational, and service programs that address DV.  Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 13 (“The 
statute authorized the appropriation of 1.62 billion dollars in federal funds to support a broad 
range of programs, including training of police, prosecutors, and judges; support of battered 
women’s shelters and rape prevention programs; creation of a national toll-free domestic 
violence telephone hotline; and establishment of a national database to improve local, state 
and federal law enforcement agencies’ ability to record and share information on domestic 
violence and stalking offenses.”).  VAWA even provides funding to provide legal assistance 
in civil protection order proceedings and efforts to improve civil protection order 
effectiveness.  See Murphy, supra note 2727, at 503.  For more information about the history 
and specific provisions of VAWA, see generally Runge, supra. 
 156  Runge, supra note 155, at 454.   
 157  Caitlin Valiulis, Fifteenth Annual Gender and Sexuality Law: Annual Review Article: 
Domestic Violence, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 123, 149 (2014) (“Institutional attitudes have 
progressed, in large part because of federal legislation such as VAWA.”). 
 158  See Weissman, supra note 91, at 1106 (“By providing a federal remedy, VAWA 
unhinged gender-based violence from its historic private and local domain, and marked a 
reconceptualization of domestic violence as a pressing public and national social problem.”).  
Specifically, “VAWA’s provisions tell [survivors] that the nation takes their plight seriously, 
allow them some control over detention hearings, and provide them with civil remedies that 
acknowledge and partly compensate them for the harm they have suffered.”  Id.  
 159  Proclamation No. 60263, 80 Fed. Reg. 60027, 60263 (Oct. 5, 2015); see also Kuennen, 
supra note 2, at 39 (“[T]he American legal system continues to struggle with the development 
of appropriate legal responses to the problems of domestic violence.”).   
 160  Runge, supra note 155, at 429 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 37 (1993)); see also 
Kohn, supra note 120, at 530 (“Because our current justice system interventions provide 
inconsistent levels of effectiveness and [survivor] satisfaction, it is time to reevaluate our 
system. . . . The prevalence of domestic violence demands that more radical changes to the 
judicial system be made.”).   
 161  Bassler, supra note 135, at 1167 (“Until there is an attitudinal change in our cultural 
acceptance of violence, legal efforts will always remain inadequate.”).  
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The United States legal system therefore needs a national “rededication 
to the civil justice response” to DV.162  DVCPO laws have “great potential,” 
when there are “procedural and substantive law changes and additional 
commitment[s] and effort by the legislative, judicial, and community 
advocacy systems.”163  With these changes, “the promise of the protection 
order can be a reality.”164  Therefore, a uniform and expansive DVCPO law 
across the United States is needed to better address and prevent DV. 
V. IMPLEMENTING A UNIFORM DVCPO LAW ACROSS THE UNITED 
STATES 
Congress likely can successfully encourage state implementation of a 
uniform DVCPO law by conditioning additional federal funding on state 
enactment of the uniform law.  First, this method is constitutional because 
Congress may “hold out incentives to the states as a method of influencing a 
state’s policy choices”165 under Congress’s Article I Spending Power.  
Second, this method conforms to federalism principles as a form of 
cooperative federalism.  Finally, this method is likely to successfully achieve 
a national, uniform DVCPO law because of the demonstrated need for 
increased DV services and programs funding. 
A. Congress Can Influence State Policy Choices Through Its 
Spending Power 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defense and general Welfare of the United States.”166  In New York v. United 
States, the United States Supreme Court held that “[u]nder Congress’s 
spending power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds.”167  As stated in South Dakota. v. Dole, use of Congress’s spending 
power is subject to the following limitations: 
 
The first of these limitations is derived from the language of the 
Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power must be in 
 
 162  Stoever2, supra note 85, at 318 (noting the need of a national rededication to 
addressing DV because of: “(1) its pervasive utilization by survivors; (2) its proven 
effectiveness relative to other interventions; and (3) its autonomy-promoting character that 
correlates with enhanced safety.”).   
 163  Stoever2, supra note 85, at 377. 
 164  Stoever2, supra note 85, at 377. 
 165  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (“Congress does not lack the ability 
to encourage a state to regulate in a particular way, and Congress may hold out incentives to 
the states as a method of influencing a state’s policy choices.”). 
 166  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.   
 167  New York, 505 U.S. at 167. 
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pursuit of the general welfare.  In considering whether a particular 
expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts 
should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.  Second, 
if Congress desires to condition the states’ receipt of federal funds, 
it must do so unambiguously, enabling the states to exercise their 
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their 
participation.  Third, conditions on federal grants might be 
illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs.  Finally, other constitutional 
provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional 
grant of federal funds.168 
 
Under the Dole standard, Congress should be able to encourage state 
adoption of a uniform DVCPO law by conditioning the procurement of 
additional funding on state enactment of the uniform law.  The first 
requirement of the Dole standard is met because encouraging state adoption 
of a uniform DVCPO law is in pursuit of the general welfare.  DV is a highly 
prevalent phenomenon across the United States with devastating effects for 
survivors, families, and communities.169  A uniform, expansive DVCPO law 
can increase survivors’ access to protection,170 reduce or eliminate future 
instances of DV,171 and can begin to change the larger social discourse about 
DV by sending a message that DV is unacceptable.172  Congressional effort 
to encourage state adoption of an expansive uniform DVCPO law is 
therefore “in pursuit of the general welfare”173 because expansive civil 
protection order laws can directly improve survivor and community safety. 
For similar reasons the third requirement is also met.  The third 
requirement demands a relation between the funding conditions and the 
federal interests in the national initiative.174  By allowing for increased 
survivor safety and protection, an expansive DVCPO law directly furthers 
federal interests in the safety and protection of DV survivors and society.175  
Therefore, by conditioning funding on enactment of a uniform DVCPO law, 
there is a direct relationship between federal interests and the law’s funding 
 
 168  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987). 
 169  See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the high prevalence 
of DV and the ways DV affects survivors, families, and communities.  
 170  See supra note 127; see, e.g., Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal 
Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 150 (2005) 
(“Each state should expand its civil protection order laws to ensure that all [survivors] and all 
types of domestic violence are covered.”).   
 171  See supra text accompanying notes 124–127.   
 172  See supra text accompanying notes 138–152.   
 173  Dole, 483 U.S.  at 205.  
 174  Id. 
 175  See supra text accompanying note 152.   
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conditions.  Finally, the second requirement of the Dole standard will be met 
as long as the funding conditions are clearly and unambiguously stated in the 
national legislation in such a way as to allow states to make informed 
decisions.176  Therefore, under the Dole standard, the use of Congress’s 
spending power to encourage the states to enact a uniform DVCPO law is 
likely constitutional. 
B. Use of the Spending Power Comports with Federalism Principles 
and Current Law 
National lawmaking in the area of DV may raise federalism concerns.  
The Supreme Court and many academics readily affirm the view that DV 
and family law are issues for state jurisprudence.177  Family law “requires a 
level of political engagement and a sense of community identity that lie 
beyond the reach of national politics.”178  States may also be better 
lawmaking forums because they can serve as laboratories of legal 
experimentation, where new laws can be made without the risk of negatively 
impacting the entire nation.179  Unfortunately, however, “states now have 
spent many years experimenting with different approaches”180 to DVCPO 
 
 176  Dole, 483 U.S. at 205. 
 177  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (“The Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, and there is no better 
example of the police power, which the Founders undeniably left reposed in the States and 
denied the central government, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its 
[survivors].  Congress therefore may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct 
based solely on the conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”); In re Burrus, 136 
U.S. 586, 586 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, 
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”); 
see also Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821 (1995) 
(“From the earliest days of the Republic until the recent past, family law has unquestionably 
belonged to the states.”).  Contra Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early 
Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1763, 1861 (2005) (“[T]here has never been a point in American history when the states 
exercised exclusive authority over family law and policy.”); Jill E. Hasday, Federalism and 
the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1998) (“[E]xclusive localism in 
family law simply mis-describes American history and concludes that family law’s actual 
historical record gives no weight to the claim that tradition should count as a reason for 
exclusive federal noninvolvement.”).  See also supra notes 153–159 for a discussion of 
VAWA and FVPSA—two national legislative responses to DV. 
 178  Dailey, supra note 177, at 1871.  Therefore, “[b]y situating communitarian politics at 
the state level . . . localism ensures that the civic participation, political dialogue, and shared 
values essential to family law will develop within the states’ smaller, relatively more 
accessible political locales.”  Id. at 1871–72.  
 179  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 180  Kuennen, supra note 2, at 40.   
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laws and there remains a significant and often unaddressed problem with DV 
across the United States.181  The remaining high prevalence and significant 
effects of DV demand “more radical changes to the judicial system. . . .”182 
Use of Congress’s spending power to encourage specific state policy 
decisions does not raise the same federalism concerns as direct congressional 
enactment.183  Rather, the spending power “exemplifies cooperative 
federalism” by utilizing the federal government’s greater financial resources 
to establish a “nation-wide standard” while “aiding functions carried out 
under state law” and preserving state discretion.184  The spending power 
“provides states with additional help or resources to fulfill their traditional 
responsibilities”185 and each individual state retains the ultimate decision-
making power.186  For example, under the proposed scheme, each state will 
decide whether to enact the uniform DVCPO law and receive additional 
funding.  In this way, the federal government does not strip states of their 
decision-making power; instead, use of the spending power reinforces “state 
initiative” and “state authority.”187 
The Child Support Enforcement Act (CSEA) similarly uses Congress’s 
spending power188 and includes provisions very similar to what is proposed 
here.  Specifically, “in exchange for financial and other incentives, CSEA 
largely determines state procedures for establishing paternity” by “requiring 
states to conform to highly specific guidelines on the content of child support 
orders.”189  Similarly, Congress should condition additional federal funding 
 
 181  See supra Part IV for a discussion of continued problems in state DVCPO legal 
systems.   
 182  Kohn, supra note 120, at 530.   
 183  See Robert E. Cowen, The Thirteenth Annual Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub Lecture: 
Federalization of State Law Questions: Upheaval Ahead, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1371, 1385 
(1995).   
 184  Id.  
 185  Estin, supra note 140, at 334.  
 186  Bassler, supra note 135, at 1185 (citing Morton Grodzins, The Federal System, in 
GOALS FOR AMERICANS, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GOALS 
265–66 (1965)) (“[F]ederal grant programs exemplify the concept of co-operative federalism 
by utilizing the greater wealth-gathering abilities of the central government and establishing 
nation-wide standards, yet [aiding] functions carried out under state law, with considerable 
state and local discretion.”).   
 187  Dailey, supra note 177, at 1886 (“Reinforcing state initiative through its spending 
power is one way in which the federal government may reinforce state authority.”).  
 188   Dailey, supra note 177, at 1885 (“The Child Support Enforcement Act is one example 
of federal legislation that seeks to promote state responsibility in the area of family 
regulation . . . .  Because the federal law induces the states to take responsibility for child 
support standards and enforcement, it can be viewed as reinforcing rather than undermining 
state authority.”). 
 189  Hasday, supra note 177, at 1380.  Congress also has successfully established national 
standards for child abuse and neglect cases by conditioning funding on states having specific 
laws.  See Michele W. Easterling, For Better of Worst: The Federalization of Domestic 
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on state adoption of a specific, expansive, DVCPO law. 
The federal government already supports state DV laws and services 
through its spending power with funding provisions in VAWA and 
FVPSA.190  If Congress already uses its spending power to support DV 
services and to create national child abuse and support standards, Congress 
should use its spending power to encourage state adoption of a uniform, 
expansive DVCPO law. 
C. States Are Likely to Adopt a Uniform DVCPO Law in Exchange 
for Increased Federal Funding 
Congress may encourage state adoption of a uniform DVCPO law by 
conditioning additional VAWA or FVPSA funding on state adoption of the 
uniform law.  These additional funds may be derived from the money that 
these programs save.  For example, VAWA reportedly saved $14.8 billion 
in averted social costs in its first six years.191  DVCPO laws also save money.  
For example, the DVCPO law in Kentucky saved the state approximately 
$85 million in one year.192  Therefore, the money saved by implementing a 
more expansive DV law across the United States may help offset the 
additional costs of creating additional federal funding. 
Another possible method to generate additional funding is to raise the 
cap of the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA).193  VOCA funds several programs 
that help crime survivors through a fund “derived entirely from fines and 
penalties paid by offenders at the federal level, and not taxpayer revenue.”194  
By increasing federal criminal fines or by utilizing more of the $6 billion in 
the fund by raising the current cap on VOCA fund disbursement, Congress 
can allocate VOCA funding for this DV initiative.195 
The spending power is likely to be successful if the proposed federal 
funds “bring real resources to the table to help states carry out their important 
functions.”196  States are currently struggling to successfully adjudicate 
DVCPO cases with “congested court dockets, inadequate resources, 
 
Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV 933, 952 (1996).  
 190  See supra notes 156–59.  VAWA is even celebrated for its “cooperative federalism.”  
See Bassler, supra note 135, at 1190.  
 191  National Network to End Domestic Violence, Reauthorization of the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA), http://nnedv.org/downloads/Policy/VAWA_Reauthorization_Fact_She
et.pdf. 
 192  Id.  
 193  Nat'l Alliance to End Sexual Violence, Victims of Crime Act, (2018), http://naesv.big
gerplanet.net/legislation-we-follow/victims-of-crime-act (last visited Apr. 24, 2018).   
 194  Id. 
 195  Id.  
 196  Estin, supra note 140, at 335.   
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unrepresented litigants, and challenging subject matter . . . .”197  Because of 
these problems, “protection order statutes have been left compromised and 
improperly enforced.”198  Significant funding increases are needed to address 
these problems.199  Because of this demonstrated need for additional funding 
to address DV, states will likely enact a uniform DVCPO law in order to 
receive additional federal funding.  Therefore, by creating additional federal 
funding under VAWA, FVPSA, or VOCA and conditioning the receipt of 
funding on state enactment of a uniform, expansive DVCPO law, Congress 
is likely to successfully encourage states to implement a uniform DVCPO 
law.200 
VI. CONCLUSION 
DV remains a significant and pervasive problem across the United 
States with dramatic effects on the individual, family, community, state, and 
national level.  Civil protection orders have great, unrealized potential to 
directly minimize DV and alleviate its devastating effects.  Through 
inclusive and expansive definitions of DV as well as a broad range of 
comprehensive relief provisions, DVCPO laws can provide more 
appropriate, necessary, and individualized relief that better protects 
survivors of all types of DV.  With dramatically different DVCPO statutes 
across the United States, uniform laws are needed.  The DVCPO’s potential 
for significant, positive impact will be further fostered by direct federal 
encouragement.  Thus, Congress should use its Article I spending power to 
condition additional federal funding (through VOCA, VAWA, or FVSPA) 
on state adoption of uniform DVCPO law.  It is time for the national 
government to work more with the states to support and encourage 
 
 197  Peter Johnsen & Elia Robertson, Protecting, Restoring, Improving: Incorporating 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Restorative Justice Concepts into Civil Domestic Violence 
Cases, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1557, 1565 (2016).  
 198  Id. at 1569.   
 199  See Goldfarb2, supra note 17, at 1550 (“Ideally, if our society is serious about 
addressing the pervasive and devastating problem of domestic violence, significantly 
increased funding should be provided to assist [DV survivors].”); Stoever2, supra note 85, at 
356 (“More resources are needed at every level, in terms of attorneys and advocates engaged 
in civil advocacy with domestic violence survivors, community resources, health 
interventions, shelters, and transitional housing.  Notwithstanding recognition that services 
by advocates and attorneys and the availability of safe shelters are essential to escaping 
violence, funding for these services has been severely cut in recent years, forcing shelters to 
close, organizations to lay off advocates and attorneys, and agencies to scale back services 
and turn away survivors in crisis.”). 
 200  Michele W. Easterling furthers a similar argument for achieving a national uniform 
DV criminal law.  See Michele W. Easterling, For Better of Worst: The Federalization of 
Domestic Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV 933, 951 (1996) (“Congress should use the available 
monetary resources to insure [sic] implementation of their [sic] ideal laws in the states, under 
state jurisdiction.”). 
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progressive state DV laws and services.  It is time for a heightened national 
response to DV.  Through a uniform, inclusive, and expansive DVCPO law 
that is recognized and encouraged by all levels of our government, we will 
be better able to protect all survivors of DV, our families, and our 
communities. 
 
